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Proposed Legislation
Proposal for Senior Offender Law
Honorable Peter M. Leavitt1
[There are] cases which, though within the words of the law, [are]
notoriously not within its intention, and are therefore relievable by
an equitable exercise of discretionary power.
-Thomas Jefferson, 18082
I. Introduction
Mr. Orville Redlo is a sixty-four-year-old veterinarian's assistant
and animal health technician in a small-town animal hospital
near Saratoga, in New York's horse country. Never blessed with
children, Mr. Redlo and his wife of forty years have come to re-
gard their neighbors and his co-workers at the animal hospital as
their own family. Although they managed to put a small nest egg
aside for retirement, Mrs. Redlo has, unfortunately, been diag-
nosed with a degenerative disease that will deprive her of her
sight in a short time. Her medical bills far exceed the limits of
Mr. Redlo's meager health insurance. Their nest egg has long
since disappeared, and their small cottage has been mortgaged to
the hilt. To make matters worse, he has been forced to work less
1. Judge Leavitt is currently County Court Judge for the County of Westches-
ter. From January 1984-December 1993, Judge Leavitt was Town Justice for the
Town of New Castle. Before ascending to the bench, Judge Leavitt was in private
practice for approximately eighteen years, and prior to that served as an Assistant
District Attorney for both the Westchester and Kings County District Attorney's
Offices.
Judge Leavitt would like to thank his Law Clerk, Albert J. Degatano and Judi-
cial Intern, Kate Cerrone, for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this
proposal.
2. Famous Quotes and Quotations: Best Quotes and Familiar Quotations (vis-
ited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.bemorecreative.com/homecq3.html>.
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hours - thereby reducing further his ability to pay for his wife's
care - so that he can be home as much as possible to help her
adjust to a suddenly sightless world.
Mr. Redlo has led a quiet, but exemplary, life. He has never been
involved in any way with the criminal justice system, much less
been arrested for, or convicted of a crime. Although he is himself
an active member of several service and charitable organizations,
he is too proud to ask for help despite his dire financial
predicament.
The veterinarian he works for is so well regarded by horse breed-
ers and trainers that, during the racing season, his business in-
creases a hundred-fold. Mr. Redlo is a valued employee, and at
such times he is often entrusted with large sums of money for de-
posit or safekeeping. One night, after a particularly busy, ex-
hausting day during the season, Mr. Redlo finds himself alone at
the animal hospital with an enormous amount of cash. His em-
ployer has been out on call all day, and is not even aware of the
size of the day's receipts. Tired, desperate and racked with anxi-
ety and guilt over his inability to provide for his wife when she
needs him most, Mr. Redlo makes a rash, life-altering decision
and steals fifty-five thousand dollars. 3 By the end of the season,
when things have settled down, the theft is discovered. By that
time, Mr. Redlo has used the money to pay some of his wife's bills.
He is eventually indicted for grand larceny in the second degree.
Despite his outstanding reputation, the high esteem with which
he had formerly been held in the community and the unques-
tioned motive for his actions, Mr. Redlo's motion to dismiss the
indictment in furtherance of justice is - reluctantly - denied and,
given the overwhelming evidence against him, he enters a plea of
guilty. At sentencing, both he and his attorney present eloquent
and impassioned arguments, extolling his stellar background and
explaining his anomalous conduct.
3. A significant portion of elder crime seems to arise from desperate economic
circumstances. "Crimes such as fraud, embezzlement, and theft are the crimes
[for] which the elderly are more often arrested." William E. Adams, Jr., The Incar-
ceration of Older Criminals: Balancing Safety, Cost and Humanitarian Concerns,
19 NOVA L. REV. 465, 471 (1995)(citing Kyle Kercher, The Causes and Correlates of
Crime Committed by the Elderly, 9 RES. ON AGING 257, 257 (1987)(citations omit-
ted)). Many of those arrested for shoplifting are first-time offenders. See Adams
(citing Daniel J. Steffensmeier, The Invention of the "New" Senior Citizen Crimi-
nal, 9 RES. ON AGING 281, 301 (1987); Manuel Voga & Mitchell Silverman, Stress
and the Elderly Convict, 32 INT'L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY AND COMPAR. CRIM. 153,
158 (1988)).
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Mr. Redlo's employer even appears on his behalf and joins his plea
for mercy and leniency, assuring the court that if Mr. Redlo is not
incarcerated he will continue to employ his old assistant, who has
agreed to work at a reduced rate in order to make at least partial
restitution. The judge is sympathetic and he announces that be-
cause such a disposition would, indeed, serve the interest of jus-
tice for all concerned, he imposes a sentence of probation for a
period of five years, rather than imprisonment. The court also im-
poses as special conditions of Mr. Redlo's probation, that he main-
tain continuous employment and make restitution to his employer
at a specific monthly rate. A rate which, Mr. Redlo assures the
judge, is quite reasonable given his salary as an animal health
technician and the financial support which has been pouring in
from the people of his community to defray his wife's medical ex-
penses. The court also grants Mr. Redlo's application for a Certifi-
cate of Relief from Disabilities.
Thus, Mr. Redlo returns to his wife and his work, determined to
rebuild what he regards as his shattered reputation, and to justify
his employer's faith and recompense his loss. Barely three
months later, however, Mr. Redlo's animal health technician's li-
cense is revoked as a consequence of his felony conviction, 4 and
his applications for reinstatement are repeatedly denied. Without
a license, the best position which his employer can offer is clean-
ing the animal cages and stalls - a job normally reserved for local
teenagers - at minimum wage. Meantime, given Mr. Redlo's in-
ability to regain his license, the employer has had to hire another
assistant, so that Mr. Redlo now has no hope of returning to his
previous employment even if his application for reinstatement of
his license were to be granted upon the termination of his sen-
tence. The employer now has no real hope of receiving any signifi-
cant restitution for his losses.
Although his employer is willing to accept a substantially reduced
rate of restitution, or even forego it entirely until Mr. Redlo can
better afford to pay, his probation officer has no choice but to file a
violation of probation with the court. Once again, the court is
moved by Mr. Redlo's situation and restores him to probation -
with a reduced rate of restitution - despite the violation. But now,
of course, Mr. Redlo is in even worse financial straits than he was
before - paying his mortgage and providing food for himself and
his disabled wife have become seriously problematic - and he
could hardly rely on the charity of those who have already given
4. See N.Y. EDUC. LAw §6709 (McKinney 1980).
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so much, even were he inclined to do so. Soon he is reduced to
shoplifting canned goods from a supermarket in the nearest city -
where he is not known - to survive. When he is caught and
charged with petit larceny, a routine check reveals that he has a
criminal record and he is held in lieu of bail which he cannot pos-
sibly post. Another violation of probation is filed with the court.
This time, however, the court has little choice but to revoke Mr.
Redlo's probationary sentence and impose a sentence of imprison-
ment, which - due to the fact that his original conviction was for a
class C felony - must be an indeterminate period of at least one to
three years.5
As this hypothetical demonstrates, a first-time offender, re-
gardless of age, circumstances, or history, will carry the stigma
of a criminal conviction for the rest of his life. Even when prose-
cutors and defense attorneys agree that harsh punishment will
be unproductive, negotiating the most lenient treatment still re-
sults in destructive effects on the defendant, his dependents,
and even on his former employer, who will have no hope of resti-
tution from a person who has no assets and cannot work to raise
the money. Instead of one less criminal on the streets, the con-
viction of some defendants results in one less productive mem-
ber of society.
For some hardened criminals who stand no chance of reha-
bilitation, the lifelong stigma is appropriate and even neces-
sary, as a constant reminder that the criminal justice system
will not tolerate their straying from the law again. However,
other offenders are not hardened criminals. These defendants
suffer from an isolated instance of poor judgment, yet suffer
from the burden of a criminal record long after the effects of
their offenses could have been remedied. This hardship is par-
ticularly poignant and unduly harsh when the defendant is
elderly.
Of course, public policy dictates that a person who has com-
mitted an act fitting every element of a crime should be pun-
ished. Public policy also stands for the principle that those who
5. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 65.20 (McKinney 1965); N.Y. SENTENCE CHARTS I &
X (McKinney 1997). For all class C felonies, including grand larceny, "the mini-
mum period of imprisonment of an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment must
be not less than one year nor more than one-third the maximum term imposed."
N.Y. PENAL LAW Chap. 40 Part 2-E commentary at 7 (1997)(citing N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.00(3)(b) (McKinney 1986) (amended 1998)).
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can be rehabilitated should, within the bounds of the law, be
rehabilitated through the criminal justice system. Some com-
mentators have reasoned that "the extent to which age is a fac-
tor in sentencing depends upon the weight given to each of the
four theories of punishment: retribution, deterrence, preven-
tion, and rehabilitation."6 According to these theories, the law
can function in a number of distinct ways: to punish the defend-
ant to counteract the harm done to the victim; to deter the de-
fendant and others from committing crimes; to remove the
defendant from society to prevent further harm; or to furnish
the defendant with skills so that he can return to society as a
contributing member.7
Although these models are often used to explain and justify
criminal laws, the reality is that punishment is not so compart-
mentalized in its application. Some cases and some defendants
may call into play any number of these concerns. For example,
some elderly criminals may be repeat offenders over a long pe-
riod of time and may be well deserving of retribution and pre-
vention. They may be far beyond the stage where deterrence or
rehabilitation could have any effect. In contrast, other elderly
defendants are subject to a single moment of bad judgment late
in life, and may warrant, and may respond well to, rehabilita-
tive treatment.
While not abandoning the other functions of punishment,
the criminal justice system has recognized that certain groups
of people are entitled to discretionary treatment when, in the
court's view, imposing the law as customarily applied will result
in unfair, prejudicial treatment that would contravene the tru-
est ends of justice. A teenager who has imprudently engaged in
criminal behavior may be found a youthful offender.8 Through
such a vehicle of discretion in the law, the court may recognize
those youths who would only be harmed or further corrupted by
a conviction, and may remove that "conviction" label when fash-
ioning a punishment.
6. Adams, supra note 3, at 476 (citing Victoria K. Kidman, The Elderly Of-
fender: A New Wrinkle in the Criminal Justice System, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 131, 142-
46 (1988)).
7. See Adams, supra note 3, at 476 (citing Kidman, supra note 6, at 142-43).
8. See infra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
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The reality is that conviction likewise futilely prejudices of-
fenders who have led model lives, only to commit their first of-
fenses late in life. Although lenient treatment could help them
cope with the harsher consequences of their offense, both to re-
store their good reputation and make restitution to the harmed
party, a conviction often renders them powerless to do either.
This proposal demonstrates that, currently, a judge is pow-
erless to allow some defendants who commit their crimes late in
life to avoid the stigma of a criminal conviction, even where that
stigma places burdens on the defendant that are unduly harm-
ful and not deserved. Part II shows the ways in which any dis-
cretion that the court could apply is rendered inapplicable by
the dynamics of New York State law. In particular, it will
demonstrate that the only vehicle in the law allowing such dis-
cretion in the disposition of indictments, the motion to dismiss
in furtherance of justice, is not available to protect elderly de-
fendants such as Mr. Redlo. It will also explore the fact that
there is no post-conviction device - such as a Certificate of Relief
from Disabilities - which adequately serves this purpose. Part
III examines an existing mechanism to protect youths from un-
just conviction and will examine the ways that this law, if ap-
plied to the elderly, could provide protection from the unjust
results of some convictions. Part IV proposes a new statute, a
Senior Offender Law, to give the court discretion in imposing
convictions and punishment upon elderly defendants in particu-
larly vulnerable circumstances, for whom the conviction would
impose consequences that would not serve public policy.
II. Background: The Current Law
New York provides a statutory framework through which a
court may preemptively intervene where it is anticipated that a
criminal prosecution will cause hardship to the defendant be-
yond what justice would require.9 As will be examined, how-
ever, this redress is not available in all cases. Specifically, it is
neither available to the hypothetical Mr. Redlo, nor to the ma-
jority of the elderly in like situations.
Under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 210.40, a
court, sua sponte, or at the request of either party, can dismiss
9. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 210.40 (McKinney 1979).
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an accusatory instrument in furtherance of justice.'0 This pro-
vision has been praised as innovative and used by other states
as a model to address dismissals in furtherance of justice."
Under this law, even where an indictment is legally sufficient, it
may be dismissed in furtherance of justice.' 2
Historically, the courts used this provision to dismiss in-
dictments where the specter of prosecution and the conse-
quences of conviction were determined to be disproportionately
harsh upon the defendant.13 For example, in People v. Davis,'4
a twenty-year-old college student was indicted for the felonious
possession of a narcotic drug.15 The court found, upon the rec-
ommendation of the Probation Department, that the defend-
ant's behavior was "an isolated instance and not characteristic
of his general behavior pattern.' 6 In addition, it was demon-
strated that the defendant possessed a "most exemplary moral
background,... extraordinarily high academic standing [at Tu-
lane University], and that he planned to contribute to society
through either the fields of medicine or teaching." 7
The indictment in that case was dismissed primarily be-
cause "a conviction... if allowed to stand, might well prove to
be an insurmountable impediment in the pursuit of his profes-
sional career."' 8 The court considered two factors: (1) "the na-
ture of and facts surrounding the crime" and (2) the defendant's
potential as a contributing member of society.' 9 The court
observed:
The criminal law is at best an imperfect instrument. Necessarily,
it speaks in absolute terms and occasionally catches in its net one
10. See id.; see also John F. Wirenius, A Model of Discretion: New York's "In-
terests of Justice" Dismissal Statute, 58 ALB. L. REV. 175, 176-77 (1994).
11. See Wirenius at 175 (citing Sheila Kles, How Much Further is the Further-
ance of Justice?, 1989 ANN. SERV. Am. L. 413, at 468-71).
12. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 210.40(1).
13. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40 commentary (McKinney 1993) (citing
People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d 204, 206 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973)). See, e.g., People v.
Graydon, 330 N.Y.S.2d 259, 262-63 (Sup. Ct. 1972); People v. Quill, 177 N.Y.S.2d
380, 381 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
14. 286 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
15. See id. at 397.
16. Id. at 398.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Davis, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
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who, should he be convicted of an offense, would suffer more
grievously than justice would require, taking into consideration
the nature of his offense, his background, and the possible future
consequences of such conviction. 20
Thus, New York at one time accepted that, in some cases,
the interests of justice were best served by dismissing indict-
ments where the defendant would experience more harm from
the conviction than that which was necessary to maintain the
integrity of a sound criminal justice system.21 However, the effi-
cacy of this approach was seriously questioned in the appellate
courts, where it was feared that the broad discretion granted to
trial courts might not serve the public's interests as effectively
as it did the interests of defendants. 22 Finally, in People v.
Belge,23 the Court of Appeals strongly expressed its dissatisfac-
tion with the existing statutory language, bemoaned the ab-
sence of any "specific criteria for the responsible exercise of the
discretion granted," and suggested that the legislature should
"require the [trial] court to articulate the manner and extent to
which the particular case meets such criteria."24 The statute
was amended in 1979,25 but the language which the legislature
adopted in order to address these deficiencies was taken from
People v. Clayton,26 a decision of the Appellate Division, Second
Department, which actually pre-dated Belge.
In Clayton, the defendant was indicted on a charge of mur-
der in the first degree.27 At trial he was found guilty of murder
in the second degree based, in part, upon his purported confes-
sions. 28 Upon conviction in 1953, Clayton was sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of thirty years to life.29 Clayton's confes-
sions were the subject of an evidentiary hearing in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in
20. Id. at 400.
21. See, e.g., People v. Graydon, 330 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Sup. Ct. 1972); People v.
Quill, 177 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
22. See People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d 204, 208 (NY App. Div. 1973).
23. 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976).
24. Id. at 377.
25. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40 commentary (McKinney 1998).
26. See People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d, 204, 208 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
27. See id. at 204-05.
28. See id. at 205.
29. See id.
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1965, when Clayton filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 30
The District Court found that Clayton's confessions were not
voluntary.31 Upon the decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit to affirm, Clayton was released on
his own recognizance and a new trial was ordered. 32 While
awaiting retrial, Clayton quickly assimilated into society and
even secured employment. 33 On remand, the Court dismissed
the indictment sua sponte in furtherance of justice, and the dis-
trict attorney appealed. 34
The trial court found that the following factors warranted a
dismissal in furtherance of justice:
the defendant had already served 19 years in prison; he could be
re-tried only for murder in the second degree, which carries a pen-
alty of an indeterminate sentence having a minimum of 20 years
and a maximum of life; court time could be better used for other
purposes; the defendant is presently free and working; and the
prosecutor had once offered to accept a plea to manslaughter, pun-
ishable by a maximum imprisonment of 20 years.35
In the Court's view, these facts clearly showed that another fel-
ony conviction and prison sentence would seriously prejudice a
reformed man who had become a productive member of the
workforce. 36 Therefore, the indictment was dismissed in fur-
therance of justice.37
30. See id. This hearing was provided after Clayton had exhausted his state
court remedies, in which his confessions were found to be voluntary. See Clayton,
41 A.D.2d at 208. These hearings were all held pursuant to the rule created by
People v. Huntley, 204 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1965), in that year, which stated
that "in all cases heretofore tried and concluded and in which confessions were
introduced and their voluntariness contested .... defendants [should] seek ... a
separate hearing as to voluntariness of a confession received in evidence against a
defendant at his trial." Huntley, 204 N.E.2d at 182.
31. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, and
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. See United States ex rel. Clayton v.
Mancusi, 326 F.Supp. 1366 (1972), affd sub nom., Mancusi v. United States ex rel.
Clayton, 454 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom., Montanye v. Clayton,
406 U.S. 977 (1972).
32. See Clayton, 41 A.D.2d at 205.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 207.
36. See id.
37. See Clayton, 41 A.D.2d at 207.
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On appeal from the dismissal, the Appellate Division stated
that the considerations weighed by the trial court were not nec-
essarily relevant, since most of these facts reflected events oc-
curring after the homicide for which the defendant was
indicted. 38 The appellate court directed that the case be re-
manded for a hearing,39 and specifically stated which factors the
trial court should use on remand. 40 Conditions such as these,
not contained in the statute, had never before been placed in a
trial court's discretion when considering a motion for dismissal
in furtherance of justice.
In imposing this new requirement, the appellate court ob-
served that the trial court's judgments should be given defer-
ence when reviewing dismissals in the furtherance of justice,
but "those judgments in turn hinge on the production of facts in
the possession of the prosecution and the defendant. Moreover,
the discretion of the court cannot be properly reviewed unless
the record discloses the facts upon which the court's judgment
was based."41 The factors which the trial court had been di-
rected to consider on remand were:
(a) The nature of the crime;
(b) The available evidence of guilt;
(c) The prior record of the defendant;
(d) The punishment already suffered by the defendant;
(e) The purpose and effect of further punishment;
(f) Any prejudice resulting to the defendant by the passage of
time; and
(g) The impact on the public interest of a dismissal of the
indictment.42
The trial court decided again to dismiss the indictment, but
on different grounds.43 The indictment was no longer dismissed
to avoid overly harsh consequences to a rehabilitated person.44
Instead, the court based its dismissal upon the questionable evi-
38. See id. at 205.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 207-08.
41. Id. at 208.
42. See Clayton, 41 A.D.2d at 208.
43. See People v. Clayton, 350 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
44. See id. Cf People v. Davis, 286 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. 1967)(indictment
dismissed to protect the future of a first time offender who was an otherwise exem-
plary college student).
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dence of guilt, the fact that Clayton had already been sentenced
and served prison time, the fact that "everyone seem[ed] to
agree there [was] no purpose in further punishment," and the
prejudice involved in trying him twenty-one years after the
event. 45 Instead of dwelling on how a felony conviction would
unfairly harm the defendant, the court focused on the appellate
court's last factor and stated that there would be "an unfavora-
ble impact on the public interest" if Clayton were to be con-
victed.46 The court pointed out that Clayton had become
involved in The Fortune Society, a program designed to aid ex-
convicts "seeking to return to society."47 The administrator of
the Society had testified that Clayton was "an inspiration to
other ex-convicts." 48
When it amended the statute, the legislature imposed fac-
tors which virtually mirrored those applied in the Clayton
case. 49  Under the Criminal Procedure Law § 210.40, as
amended in 1979, "in determining . .. the existence of some
compelling factor ... clearly demonstrating that conviction or
prosecution of the defendant ... would constitute or result in
injustice . . . the court must, to the extent applicable, examine
and consider, individually and collectively, the following:" 50
(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;
(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense;
(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at
trial;
(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant;
(e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement per-
sonnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the
defendant;
(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sen-
tence authorized for the offense;
(g) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in
the criminal justice system;
(h) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the
community;
45. Clayton, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
46. Id. at 497.
47. Id. at 496.
48. Id.
49. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 1979).
50. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40 commentary (McKinney 1993).
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i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the com-
plainant or victim with respect to the motion;
(j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of convic-
tion would serve no useful purpose.51
As a result, the statute evolved into a vehicle for anticipating
"guilt or innocence, 
... [no] longer dependent upon a showing
that the defendant has been put at a disadvantage in the
case."52 Thus, although the genesis of this law is rooted in the
plight of defendants such as the hypothetical Mr. Redlo,53
changes in the statute have removed such defendants from its
protection. 54 The Court of Appeals has decreed that the
amended statute be strictly applied and, where trial courts have
failed to adhere to the "Clayton" factors, dismissals have con-
sistently been reversed.55 It is well settled that dismissals in
furtherance of justice must be used sparingly. 56 Even where a
defendant's exemplary character and history as a law-abiding
citizen is unquestioned, this alone is inadequate to justify a dis-
missal in furtherance of justice.57 In most cases, therefore,
though the court recognizes the unfortunate ruin of a defend-
ant's prior laudable reputation, it must nevertheless deny the
motion for dismissal.58
In People v. Kelley,5 9 for example, an order of dismissal was
reversed because it was based solely upon the defendant's ex-
emplary background. 60 The defendant was a police officer, with
51. N.Y. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAw § 210.40(1)(a)-(j) (McKinney 1979).
52. N.Y. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 210.40 commentary (McKinney 1993).
53. "The genesis of'furtherance of justice' dismissals... [was] related to some
factor that put the defendant at a disadvantage in the case." Id.
54. See supra notes 49-52 & accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., People v. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1983); People v. Andrew,
432 N.Y.S.2d 252 (App.Div. 1980).
56. See, e.g., People v. Ortis, 152 A.D.2d 755, 755 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Peo-
ple v. Foster, 127 A.D.2d 684, 685 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1987); People v. Rucker, 144
A.D.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
57. See Ortis, 152 A.D.2d at 755 (citing People v. Diggs, 125 A.D.2d 189, 191
(Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1986); People v. Belkota, 50 A.D.2d 118, 122 (Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1975)).
58. See, e.g., People v. Belkota, 50 A.D.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1975)(although the community benefited from the defendant police officer's con-
duct during a drug investigation and although the defendants had good records as
police officers, their convictions were upheld).
59. 141 A.D.2d 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
60. See id. at 765.
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no prior record and an excellent reputation. 61 The appellate
court noted that, although the defendant's place in society
would be irreparably harmed by the conviction, "[t]his is not one
of those 'rare' and 'unusual' cases that 'cries out for fundamen-
tal justice beyond the confines of conventional considera-
tions.'"62 Indeed, even where the most hard-hearted prosecutor
could not but feel some degree of compassion for a defendant's
plight - as in those all too prevalent cases involving defendants
who have been diagnosed with the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) - the "interests of justice" do not necessarily man-
date dismissal. In the late 1980's many courts were inclined to
grant such motions for first-time offenders who were HIV posi-
tive, 63 reasoning that these defendants had already been given
a life sentence by such a dread disease and that a traditional
criminal disposition would not be productive or fair.64 Nor-
mally, the factor that the courts used in these cases was the
"history, character and condition of the defendant," such that
the defendant's terminal medical condition justified vacating
the conviction and imposing a less harsh punishment.65
Parenthetically, this approach would seem particularly apt in
cases such as Mr. Redlo's, and other elderly first-time offenders
whose age, physical and/or mental condition, and exemplary
background would merit consideration under the "history, char-
acter, and condition" factor. 66 However, any defendant's likeli-
hood of success on this basis has since dwindled to nothing.
For example, in People v. Sierra,67 the defendant pled guilty
to two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance. 68
Upon consideration of the defendant's motion to dismiss in fur-
61. See id.
62. Id. at 765 (citing People v. Belge, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. 1976)).
63. See, e.g., People v. Camargo, 516 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1006-07 (Sup. Ct.
1986)(The New York Supreme Court, Bronx County, held that, although the de-
fendant's guilt was "overwhelming," and although he had a prior record, the indict-
ment was dismissed because, in light of the defendant's advanced stage of AIDS,
"[n]o sentence . . . could compare with the severity of the many diseases being
painfully and fatally suffered by this defendant."; People v. Gray, N.Y.L.J. June 26,
1986, Col. 3, at 18 (Friedman, J.)(Defendant died of AIDS prior to decision; court
indicated that it would have granted the Clayton motion based upon his condition).
64. See, e.g., Camargo, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 1006-07.
65. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 210.40(1)(d) (McKinney 1979).
66. Id.
67. 566 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
68. See id.
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therance of justice, the court found that the defendant was HIV
positive and was suffering several HIV-related infections and
ailments. 69 Nevertheless, the defendant's motion was denied.7 0
The court determined that "[t]o allow an individual . . . to use
his medical misfortunes... as a tool to totally bypass the justice
system is unacceptable."71
Despite the horrific prospects and grievous suffering which
haunt anyone who has been diagnosed with HIV, a dismissal in
furtherance of justice on this basis alone is simply antithetical
to both the letter and spirit of the statute. Dismissal in further-
ance ofjustice is an extraordinary remedy which should be used
sparingly, and only in that 'rare' and 'unusual' case where it
'cries out for fundamental justice'."72 It grants the defendant a
total and pre-emptive reprieve from both the demands of the
criminal justice system and accountability for his actions and,
thereby, deprives both society at large and the defendant's im-
mediate victims of any chance for "justice" from their perspec-
tive. Moreover, granting dismissal based upon a defendant's
condition creates, in effect, a class of defendants entitled to dis-
missal simply because they share that condition; a result which
turns the statute on its head.73 And, for these very reasons, a
motion for dismissal in furtherance ofjustice was as inappropri-
ate and ultimately unsuccessful for our hypothetical Mr. Redlo
as it has been for those real defendants who have been diag-
nosed with HIV.7 4
While there is another, post-conviction, statutory device
which is ostensibly intended to provide relief where the conse-
quences of conviction may be overly and unnecessarily harsh, it
too was essentially worthless to Mr. Redlo. Under Article 23 of
69. See id.
70. See id. at 819.
71. Id.
72. People v. Insignares, 491 N.Y.S.2d 166, 175 (App. Div. 1985)(citing People
v. Belge (N.Y. 1976)). See, e.g., People v. Ortiz, 152 A.D.2d 755, 755 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989); People v. Foster, 127 A.D.2d 684, 685 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1987); People v.
Rucker, 144 A.D.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
73. See N.Y. Crim. Pro Law § 210.40 (McKinney 1979).
74. See, e.g., People v. Murray, 634 N.Y.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1995)(defendant was
not entitled to dismissal of indictment based on the fact that he had AIDS); People
v. Pender, 593 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (Sup. Ct. 1992)("The mere fact that a defendant
charged with a serious crime has contracted AIDS should not serve as a talisman
for automatic dismissals in the furtherance of justice.").
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the New York Corrections Law, a "certificate of relief from disa-
bilities" may be granted to relieve a defendant convicted of a
felony from any automatic forfeiture of rights, such as the right
to run for public office, and to lift any automatic bar to employ-
ment due to the felony conviction. 75 This ameliorative device is
available to first-time offenders. 76 In practical effect, however,
the certificate of relief from disabilities does not prevent a li-
censing board from denying a professional license to a convicted
felon. The certificate of relief statute contains the following
provision:
A certificate of relief from disabilities shall not, however, in any
way prevent any judicial, administrative, licensing or other body,
board or authority from relying upon the conviction specified
therein as the basis for the exercise of its discretionary power to
suspend, revoke, refuse to issue or refuse to renew any license,
permit or other authority or privilege. 77
This provision has operated to allow the Board of Education of
New York, which has the authority to grant and revoke profes-
sional licenses, to deny licensure to professionals who were con-
victed of felonies, even when a certificate of relief from
disabilities had been granted by the courts. 78 In Plantone v.
New York Department of State, Division of Licensing Services,79
the petitioner was convicted upon his plea of guilty of attempted
arson in the third degree and conspiracy in the fourth degree.80
Petitioner was a real estate salesperson who risked the loss of
his license due to his felony conviction.8' At sentencing, the
court granted a certificate of relief from disabilities. 82 Finding
75. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAw § 701(1) (McKinney 1966)(amended 1985).
76. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 700(1)(1) (McKinney 1966)(amended 1972).
77. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 701(3) (McKinney 1966)(amended 1985).
78. See, e.g., Matter of Maneri v. New York State Department of State, 240
A.D.2d 748 (N.Y. App, Div. 1997)(Secretary of State revoked a real estate broker's
license and notary public commission even though the defendant had been granted
a relief from disabilities); Matter of Pulaski Inn, 182 A.D.2d 1116 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992)(fact that liquor licensee's president had been granted a relief from civil disa-
bilities did not preclude the removal of the Inn's liquor license by the State Liquor
Authority).
79. 674 N.Y.S.2d 560 (App. Div. 1998).
80. See id. at 561.
81. See id.
82. See id.; see also N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 700 et seq. (McKinney 1966)
(amended 1972).
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that it was "well settled that a certificate of relief from disabili-
ties does not preclude a licensing body from exercising its dis-
cretion to revoke a license over which the licensing body has
authority,"8 3 the Appellate Division held that the certificate
merely precluded automatic revocation of petitioner's license.8 4
Despite the certificate, the licensing board could revoke his li-
cense on the basis of his conviction, as long as its determination
that the petitioner was "untrustworthy" was not arbitrary or
capricious.85
Thus, the granting of a certificate of relief from disabilities,
designed by the court to preserve the defendant's productive
employment, does not guarantee the relief from this particular
onus of a conviction. Mr. Redlo still lost his license as an
animal health technician. Moreover, were he to seek employ-
ment in another field which did not require licensure he would
still, upon inquiry, have to disclose his status as a convicted
felon. A certificate of relief from disabilities does not alter or
effect in anyway the underlying judgment of conviction.8 6
III. The Youthful Offender Procedure
Unlike a dismissal in furtherance of justice - which
preempts the entire prosecutorial process - or a certificate of re-
lief from disabilities - which leaves the judgment of conviction
entirely intact, though it may occasionally blunt an effect
thereof - the youthful offender procedure empowers the court to
vacate the judgment of conviction, but only after the prosecu-
tion has run its full course.87
The Youthful Offender Procedure has been in existence for
over half a century.88 The only problem for Mr. Redlo is that it
only operates for the benefit of defendants between the ages of
83. Plantone, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 561 (citing Matter of Maneri v. New York State
Department of State, 240 A.D.2d 748 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Matter of Pulaski Inn,
182 A.D.2d 1116 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Matter of Alaimo v. Ambach, 91 A.D.2d 695
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982)).
84. See Plantone, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 561 (citations omitted).
85. See id.
86. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAw § 701 (McKinney 1966)(amended 1985).
87. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.10 (McKinney 1986).
88. See N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAw § 720.10 commentary (McKinney 1971)
(amended 1986).
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sixteen and nineteen.8 9 Under this statute, an eligible youth
may be relieved of the stigma and consequences of a criminal
conviction. 90
After conviction, and before imposing sentence, the court
must order a "pre-sentence investigation."91 Upon receipt of the
report of said investigation, the court may find the defendant a
youthful offender if, "in the opinion of the court, the interest of
justice would be served by relieving the eligible youth from the
onus of a criminal record and by not imposing an indeterminate
term of imprisonment of more than four years."92 If the convic-
tion is for a misdemeanor only, and the defendant has no prior
youthful offender adjudications or criminal convictions, the
court must find the defendant a youthful offender. 93
In reaching their determination, most courts tend to focus
on the following factors:
the gravity of the crime and manner in which it was committed,
mitigating circumstances, defendant's prior criminal record, prior
acts of violence, recommendations in the presentence reports, de-
fendant's reputation, the level of cooperation with authorities, de-
fendant's attitude toward society and respect for the law, and the
prospects for rehabilitation and hope for a future constructive
life. 94
If a defendant is found a youthful offender, "the court must
direct that the conviction be deemed vacated and replaced by a
youthful offender finding... The court [then] must sentence the
defendant pursuant to [specific guidelines in] the penal law."95
If the conviction was not for a felony, the sentencing follows the
usual guidelines set out in the Penal Law, with one limited ex-
ception.96 If the sentence imposed upon a youthful offender
89. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 720.10(1) (McKinney 1971)(amended 1980)
("'Youth' means a person charged with a crime alleged to have been committed
when he was at least sixteen years old and less than nineteen years old.").
90. See id.
91. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 720.20(1).
92. Id. § 720.20(1)(a).
93. Id. § 720.20(1)(b).
94. People v. Cruickshank, 105 AD2d 325, 334 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)(citing Peo-
ple v. McCloskey, 92 A.D.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)).
95. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.20(3). See People v. Soto, 315 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31
(App. Div. 1969).
96. "If the youthful offender finding was entered pursuant to [§ 720.20(1)(b)]
of the criminal procedure law, the court must not impose a definite or intermittent
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finding is substituted for a felony, "the court must impose a sen-
tence [usually authorized for] a class E felony," with, again, one
limited exception. 97 This sentencing mechanism shields youth-
ful offenders from long prison terms.
The statute also shields the youthful offender from the onus
of a conviction. Instead of a conviction, "the youthful offender
finding and sentence merge into a 'youthful offender adjudica-
tion."' 98 The youthful offender's conviction is vacated and re-
placed by a youthful offender finding.99 Thus, the statute is
designed so that a person adjudicated under the youthful of-
fender procedure "is not to suffer any of the disabilities that fol-
low upon conviction. " 100 Specifically, the adjudication "does not
operate as a disqualification ... to hold public office or public
employment or to receive any license granted by public author-
ity."101 In addition, all records of the finding are sealed.10 2
The Youthful Offender Procedure is a progressive legisla-
tive approach to the problems presented when young, but le-
gally responsible, adults engage in criminal conduct. It allows
courts, on an ad hoc basis, to shield an eligible youth from the
stigma of a criminal conviction and a criminal record as a conse-
quence of hasty, thoughtless, desperate or immature conduct
which, though "criminal," has not yet - and may never - become
sentence of imprisonment with a term of more than six months." N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 60.02 (McKinney 1979) (amended 1980); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.20(1)(b)
(McKinney 1971) (amended 1980). Section 720.20(1)(b) refers to the case in which
the youthful offender finding is made because the defendant has no prior convic-
tion or youthful offender finding. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.20(1)(b). This
six-month maximum was imposed to circumvent any possible claims by youthful
offenders to a jury trial. "There is no state or federal constitutional right to a trial
by jury for offenses tried in a local criminal court and punishable by a term of
imprisonment that is not in excess of six months." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.20
commentary (McKinney 1980).
97. "The court must not impose a sentence of conditional discharge or uncon-
ditional discharge if the youthful offender finding was substituted for a conviction
of a felony defined in article two hundred twenty of [Chapter 720 of the Criminal
Procedure Law]." N.Y. PENAL LAw § 60.02 (McKinney 1980); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAw § 720.20(1)(b) (McKinney 1971) (amended 1980).
98. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 720.10(4) (McKinney 1971) (amended 1986).
99. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 720.20(3).
100. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 720.30 (McKinney 1971).
101. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 720.35(1) (McKinney 1971) (amended 1992).
102. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 720.35(2).
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habitual or recidivist. 0 3 Moreover, since the procedure is a
post-conviction mechanism, the prosecutorial process is not pre-
empted. 104 The guilty defendant is not excused from responsi-
bility for his actions.' 0 5 Furthermore, neither society at large
nor the particular victim of the defendant's actions are denied
"justice." Adjudication as a youthful offender merely grants de-
serving defendants a much better chance to conform their con-
duct to societal expectations then they would have with a
criminal record. 0 6 Additionally, a prior youthful offender adju-
dication may be considered in the determination of sentence for
subsequent criminal convictions or upon latter applications for
parole release so that the youthful offender who fails to take
advantage of this opportunity may not use it to frustrate the
righteous operation of the criminal justice system.'0 7
IV. Resolution
The State of New York would greatly benefit from a provi-
sion in the Criminal Procedure Law giving courts discretion
when sentencing the elderly defendant. A mechanism similar
to that used for youthful offenders would allow courts to fashion
dispositions which would be just for both the injured party and
the defendant. 08 This provision would also help to alleviate the
prevalent problems of prison overcrowding and the expense of
supporting elderly inmates. 10 9
A. Goal
The basic goal of a Senior Offender Procedure would be es-
sentially identical to the Youthful Offender Procedure: to pro-
tect some seniors from the stigma of a conviction and a criminal
record, when the defendant is a first-time offender and the acts
that gave rise to the conviction were "hasty or thoughtless acts
103. See, e.g., People v. Cruickshank, 105 A.D.2d 325, 336 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985)(citing People v. Drayton, 350 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976)).
104. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 720.10 (McKinney 1971)(amended 1986).
105. See People v. Caruso, 400 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
106. See People v. Soto, 315 N.Y.2d 30, 33 (App. Div. 1969).
107. See id.
108. See infra notes 85-117 & accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 98-102 & accompanying text.
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which, although crimes, [were] not the serious deeds of hard-
ened criminals."110
Recognition that hasty or thoughtless criminal behavior by
a first-time offender occurs in the very old as well as the very
young is not a new concept. For example, some states, such as
Tennessee, have recognized the age of the defendant, at either
end of the spectrum, to be a mitigating factor that the court may
consider when sentencing a criminal defendant."' The perti-
nent part of the statute reads:
If appropriate for the offense, mitigating factors may include.
The defendant, because of youth or old age, lacked substantial
judgment in committing the offense.1 2
B. Eligibility for Senior Offender Status
The following definition of those defendants eligible for Se-
nior Offender status is proposed:
Senior Offender Procedure; Definition of Terms Modeled After
New York Criminal Procedure Law § 720.10
1. "Senior" means a person charged with a crime alleged to have
been committed when he or she was of advanced age.
The range of ages within which a person may be considered
to be "of advanced age" should be determined based upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. It is clear from logic and
experience, as well as other cases, that numerical age alone is
not a reliable measure as to how a particular person is affected
by his or her age."13
The United States Sentencing Commission suggested a
similar approach in a policy statement issued in 1989:
Age is not ordinarily ... relevant in determining the type of sen-
tence to be imposed when the guidelines provide sentencing op-
tions. Age may be a reason to go below the guidelines when the
offender is elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment
110. Id.
111. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(6) (1989).
112. Id.(emphasis added).
113. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18046
(May 13, 1989)(age must be accompanied by "an extraordinary physical impair-
ment" to affect sentencing. United States v. Cary, 895 F.2d 318, 324 (7th Cir.
1990)(citing Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18046)).
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(e.g., home confinement) might be equally efficient as and less
costly than incarceration. 114
When deciding whether a particular defendant is "elderly
and infirm" such that the court is justified in imposing a lower
punishment than those outlined in the federal sentencing
guidelines, courts have performed a "facts and circumstances"
type of analysis. 115 In United States v. Carey," 6 the Seventh
Circuit considered whether a defendant's age and infirmity
could justify a downward departure from the federal sentencing
guidelines in a prosecution for check-kiting." 7 The defendant
was a sixty-four year-old man who had undergone three sur-
geries attempting to reduce a brain tumor, was still dependent
upon medication for problems arising from the tumor, and had
just undergone exploratory surgery in an effort to rule out lung
cancer."18
The Circuit Court found that, for age and physical condi-
tion to operate as factors in a downward departure from the
sentencing guidelines, the physical condition had to be an ex-
traordinary impairment. 19 In overturning the District Court's
finding that defendant was "elderly and infirm," the Circuit
Court held that the District Court had failed to specify facts
supporting that, in Carey's circumstances, his age and cancer
created an extraordinary physical impairment. 20
Therefore, the extent to which "advanced age" may be
taken into account should be dependent upon the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. This consideration invites an inquiry
such as: whether the defendant was prompted by an unfortu-
nate circumstance that traditionally or usually affects the older
population; or whether the defendant was prompted by a degen-
erative mental or physical ailment that traditionally or usually
114. Id. See Molly Fairchild James, The Sentencing of Elderly Criminals, 29
Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1025 (1992).
115. See United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 324 (7 th Cir. 1990).
116. 895 F.2d 318 (7 h Cir. 1990).
117. See id. at 318-20.
118. See id. at 320.
119. See id. at 324; see also Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52
Fed. Reg. 18046, 18102 (May 13, 1989) §§ 5H1.1 & 5H1.4.
120. See Carey, 895 F.2d at 324.
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affects the older population, 121 such that he or she could be char-
acterized as elderly.
A provision such as this performs a dual function. As the
United States Sentencing Commission recognized, in addition
to serving the protective function similar to that provided by the
Youthful Offender Procedure, 122 it would have a cost-saving
function. Some older inmates who have received prison
sentences require special facilities due to physical handicaps
caused by age, as well as expensive medication and physician
care. Some demand around-the-clock care from the prison hos-
pitals. 123 Even if not infirm, the elderly as a group require "spe-
cialized recreation, education, and work programs."' 24  As
compared to the cost of maintaining and providing for younger
inmates, the cost to society of the elderly inmate is almost three
times more. 25 The estimated cost to support an elderly inmate
is $60,000 to $69,000 per year, in comparison to about $20,000
for the average inmate.126 Adjudicating some of these elderly
defendants as Senior Offenders would allow the court to reduce
or eliminate prison sentences when both the effects on the in-
mate and the cost to society would far outweigh its beneficial
effects.127
A defendant who succeeds in proving that he or she is "of
advanced age" would be tried as an "apparently eligible senior,"
121. An issue as to proof of a mental ailment arises, because degenerative
mental diseases such as Alzheimer's and senility already provide an affirmative
defense to the element of intent under the New York Penal Law. See N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 40.15 (McKinney 1984). As such, a defendant may be permitted to both
claim this as a basis for a finding of"advanced age" under the statute, and also use
it as an affirmative defense to the proof of intent. Therefore, it is important to
ensure that a defendant, who fails to show "advanced age" is not prejudiced at trial
when presenting a defense to intent because of mental ailment. Likewise, a senior
who succeeds in proving advanced age at the pre-trial stage should not be unfairly
advantaged in proving his or her affirmative defense at trial.
122. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
123. See Jason S. Ornduff, Releasing the Elderly Inmate: A Solution to Prison
Overcrowding, 4 ELDER L. J. 173, 174 (1996)(citing Julian H. Wright, Jr., Note:
Life-Without-Parole: An Alternative to Death or Not Much of a Life at All?, 43
VAND. L. REV. 529, 563 (1990)).
124. Ornduff, supra note 123, at 175 (citations omitted).
125. See id. (citations omitted).
126. See id. at 175 n.16.
127. This approach to the elderly defendant would likewise help to solve the
problem of prison overcrowding. Full consideration of this issue is beyond the
scope of this paper. See, e.g., Ornduff, supra note 123.
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which would allow the prosecution to proceed against the de-
fendant, but with one exception for privacy, as under the Youth-
ful Offender Procedure. 128 Upon conviction, the court would
determine eligibility for Senior Offender treatment, according to
the following requirements:
2. "Eligible senior" means a person who is eligible to be found a
senior offender. Every senior is so eligible unless:
a. the conviction to be replaced by a senior offender finding
is for (i) a class A-I or class A-II felony, or (ii) an armed
felony as defined in subdivision 41 of § 1.20, except as pro-
vided in subdivision three of this section, or (iii) rape in
the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, or aggravated
sexual abuse, except as provided in subdivision three of
this section; or
b. such person has previously been convicted and sentenced
for a felony; or
c. such person has previously been adjudicated either a se-
nior offender or a youthful offender following conviction of
a felony.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision two, a person
who has been convicted of an armed felony offense or of rape
in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, or aggravated
sexual abuse is an eligible senior if the court determines that
one or more of the following factors exist:
a. mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the
manner in which the crime was committed; or
b. where the defendant was not the sole participant in the
crime, the defendant's participation was relatively minor
although not so minor as to constitute a defense to the
prosecution.
Where the court determines that the eligible senior is a senior
offender, the court shall make a statement on the record of the
reasons for its determination, a transcript of which shall be for-
warded to the state division of criminal justice services, to be kept
in accordance with the provisions of § 837-a(3) of the executive
law.
This framework for deciding eligibility, which forecloses de-
fendants convicted of certain felonies, allows the court to recog-
nize those defendants whose crimes are considered so
128. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 720.15 (McKinney 1971) (amended 1985);
N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 720.10 commentary (McKinney 1986).
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particularly heinous by society as to foreclose special protection.
This treatment is consistent with the public policy concerns
that the felony conviction onus serves to deter and prevent
hardened criminals from becoming repeat offenders. 129
The following definition sections would likewise follow the
framework of the Youthful Offender Law:
4. "Senior Offender finding" means a finding, substituted for the
conviction of an eligible senior, pursuant to a determination
that the eligible senior is a Senior Offender.
5. "Senior Offender sentence" means the sentence imposed upon
a Senior Offender finding.
6. "Senior Offender adjudication" is comprised of a Senior Of-
fender finding and the Senior Offender sentence imposed
thereon and is completed by imposition and entry of the Se-
nior Offender sentence.
C. Procedure for Arraigning and Prosecuting an "Apparently
Eligible Senior"
The next section provides privacy from public disclosure of
the proceedings against the defendant, upon the court's initial
finding that he or she is an "apparently eligible senior."
Senior Offender Procedure; Sealing of Accusatory Instrument;
Privacy of Proceedings Modeled After New York Criminal Proce-
dure Law § 720.15
1. When an accusatory instrument against an apparently eligi-
ble senior is filed with a court, the court, with the defendant's
consent, must order that it be filed as a sealed instrument,
though only with respect to the public.
2. When a senior is initially arraigned upon an accusatory in-
strument, such arraignment and all proceedings in the action
thereafter may, in the discretion of the court and with the de-
fendant's consent, be conducted in private.
3. The provisions of subdivisions one and two of this section re-
quiring or authorizing the accusatory instrument filed against
a senior to be sealed and the arraignment and all proceedings
in the action to be conducted in private, shall not apply in con-
nection with a pending charge of committing any felony of-
fense as defined in the penal law. The provisions of
subdivision one requiring the accusatory instrument filed
129. See supra notes 6-7 & accompanying text.
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against a senior to be sealed shall not apply where such senior
has been adjudicated a senior offender or convicted of a crime.
Subdivision three is modeled after 1978 and 1985 amend-
ments to the Youthful Offender procedure law. 130 The 1978
amendment was prompted by a concern of the legislature to de-
ter crime by publicly identifying those defendants who commit-
ted the most serious and violent felonies. 3 1
In 1985, the legislature determined that public access to
misdemeanor charges against a defendant who had been "previ-
ously convicted of or adjudicated for a crime" would likewise
serve an important deterrent effect. 32 This framework is a
good model for relieving the stigma of a criminal adjudication,
and yet providing for the deterrence of certain crimes.
D. Post-Conviction Procedure
Senior Offender Determination; When and How Made; Procedure
Thereupon Modeled After New York Criminal Procedure Law
§ 720.20
1. Upon conviction of an eligible senior, the court must order a
pre-sentence investigation of the defendant. After receipt of a
written report of the investigation and at the time of pro-
nouncing sentence the court must determine whether or not
the eligible senior is a senior offender. Such determination
shall be in accordance with the following criteria:
(a) If in the opinion of the court the interest of justice would
be served by relieving the eligible senior from the onus of
a criminal record and by not imposing an indeterminate
term of imprisonment of more than four years, the court
may, in its discretion, find the eligible senior is a senior
offender; and
(b) Where the conviction is had in a local criminal court and
the eligible senior had not prior to commencement of trial
or entry of a plea of guilty been convicted of a crime or
found a senior offender, the court must find he is a senior
offender.
2. Where an eligible senior is convicted of two or more crimes set
forth in separate counts of an accusatory instrument or set
forth in two or more accusatory instruments consolidated for
130. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 720.15 commentary (McKinney 1985).
131. See id.
132. Id.
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trial purposes, the court must not find him a senior offender
with respect to any such conviction pursuant to subdivision
one of this section unless it finds him a senior offender with
respect to all such convictions.
3. Upon determining that an eligible senior is a Senior Offender,
the court must direct that the conviction be deemed vacated
and replaced by a Senior Offender finding; and the court must
sentence the defendant pursuant to [a new section] of the pe-
nal law.
4. Upon determining that an eligible senior is not a Senior Of-
fender, the court must order the accusatory instrument un-
sealed and continue the action to judgment pursuant to the
ordinary rules of governing criminal prosecutions.
E. Sentencing
The New York Penal Code referred to in the Senior Of-
fender Law would provide for the sentencing of Senior Offend-
ers as follows:
Authorized Disposition; Senior Offender Modeled After New York
Penal Law § 60.02
1. If the sentence is to be imposed upon a Senior Offender find-
ing which has been substituted for a conviction of an offense
other than a felony, the court must impose a sentence author-
ized for the offense for which the Senior Offender finding was
substitute, except that if the senior offender finding was en-
tered pursuant to [the section providing that, if the conviction
was had in a local criminal court and the eligible senior had
not prior to commencement of trial or entry of a plea of guilty
been convicted of a crime or found a senior offender, that he or
she must be found eligible] the court must not impose a defi-
nite or intermittent sentence of imprisonment with a term of
more than six months;133 or
2. If the sentence is to be imposed upon a Senior Offender find-
ing which has been substituted for a conviction for any felony,
the court must impose a sentence authorized to be imposed
upon a person convicted of a class E felony provided, however,
that the court must not impose a sentence of conditional dis-
charge or unconditional discharge if the Senior Offender find-
133. See supra note 96 for a discussion regarding the reasoning behind this
provision.
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ing was substituted for a conviction of a felony defined in
Article 220 of the New York Penal Law. 34
The practical effect of these sentencing guidelines will be
the same effect achieved by the Youthful Offender sentencing
guidelines. 135 Although the court can be lenient if the circum-
stances call for forbearance, the judge may also impose more
severe punishment if necessary. The "widest array of sentenc-
ing options are available."1 36 This array of options is made
available through the Class E Felony sentencing structure,
which is "subject to the general menu of sentences" authorized
under New York law.137
F. Post-Judgment Relief
The next section of the Senior Offender Law would state
that all post-judgment relief available to other defendants
would likewise be available after a Senior Offender
adjudication:
Senior Offender Adjudication: Post-Judgment Motions and Ap-
peal Modeled After New York Criminal Procedure Law § 720.30
The provisions of this chapter, governing the making and
determination of post-judgment motions and the taking and de-
termination of appeals in criminal cases, apply to post-judg-
ment motions and appeals with respect to senior offender
adjudications wherever such provisions can reasonably be so
applied.
G. Effect of a Senior Offender Adjudication
The last section of the Senior Offender Law would specify
the central function of the Senior Offender adjudication. It
would state that the Senior Offender would not suffer any of the
debilities that usually attach to a conviction.
Senior Offender Adjudication; Effect Thereof; Records Modeled
After New York Criminal Procedure Law § 720.35
134. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 220.10 et seq. (McKinney 1970) (amended
1996) (providing rules for entering pleas).
135. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.02 (McKinney 1979) (amended 1980).
136. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 60.02 commentary (McKinney 1980).
137. N.Y. PENAL LAw Article 60 commentary (McKinney 1997 Main Volume).
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1. A Senior Offender adjudication is not a judgment of conviction
for a crime or any other offense, and does not operate as a
disqualification of any person so adjudged to hold public office
or public employment or to receive any license granted by
public authority but shall be deemed a conviction only for the
purposes of transfer of supervision and custody pursuant to
§ 259-m of the executive law. 138
2. Except where specifically required or permitted by statute or
upon specific authorization from the court, all official records
and papers, whether on file with the court, a policy agency or
the division of criminal justice services, relating to a case in-
volving a senior who has been adjudicated a Senior Offender,
are confidential and may not be made available to any person
or public or private agency, other than an institution to which
such senior has been committed, the division of parole and a
probation department of this state that requires such official
records and papers for the purpose of carrying out duties spe-
cifically authorized by law. However, that information re-
garding an order of protection or temporary order of
protection issued pursuant to § 530.12 of this chapter 139 or a
warrant issued in connection therewith may be maintained on
the statewide automated order of protection and warrant reg-
istry established pursuant to § 221-a of the executive law140
during the period that such order or protection or temporary
order of protection is in full force and effect or during which
such warrant may be executed. Such confidential information
may be made available pursuant to law only for purposes of
adjudicating or enforcing such order of protection or tempo-
rary order of protection.
By following the preexisting scheme present in the Youthful Of-
fender Law, the Senior Offender Law could provide a procedure
for seniors that is essentially the same procedure that has been
utilized for youths since 1971.141 By adopting the existing legis-
lative framework, the Senior Offender Procedure will be based
138. See N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 259-m (McKinney 1977) (governing compacts with
other states for out-of-state parolee supervision).
139. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 530.12 (McKinney 1977) (amended 1994)
(governing the protection for victims of domestic violence and family offenses).
140. See N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAw § 221-a (McKinney 1994) (amended 1995) (au-
thorizing the superintendent of state police to "develop a comprehensive plan for
the establishment and maintenance of a statewide computerized registry of all or-
der of protection" issued statewide).
141. See L.1971, c. 981, § 1.
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upon a foundation that has been tested, revamped, and upheld
as constitutional for over twenty years.
142
V. Conclusion
Had an equivalent of the Youthful Offender Procedure been
available for elderly defendants, our hypothetical Mr. Redlo
would have been a prototypical candidate therefor. Given his
exemplary background, strong community support and his em-
ployer's representations to the court, he would, in all
probability, have been found a "senior offender." Mr. Redlo
would not have had a felony conviction or criminal record and
his professional license would not have been revoked. He would
have been able to continue in his job and, thereby, maintain a
degree of self-respect and self-sufficiency. His ailing wife would
not have been deprived of his comfort, aid and support, and his
employer would have continued to receive recompense for his
monetary losses.
The Youthful Offender Procedure has been criticized as an
unproductive, overly lenient exercise in futility, which accom-
plishes nothing more than to give budding criminals "one free
bite at the apple."143 This attitude reflects a short-sighted view
of the nobler purposes of our criminal justice system and the
very foundations of our criminal and penal laws. Moreover,
even if it were a valid criticism of the Youthful Offender Proce-
dure, it would be entirely meritless as an argument against a
Senior Offender Procedure. One can hardly contend that some-
one in Mr. Redlo's situation was likely to embark upon a life of
crime and, therefore, that the court would have done little more
than ease his way upon that journey had his first criminal con-
viction been vacated.
142. See, e.g., People v. Drummond, 359 N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 1976); cert. denied
431 U.S. 908 (1976)(upholding early requirement, since removed from the statute,
that eligibility for youthful offender treatment be conditioned upon the highest
count of indictment was found to be violative of due process); Malinowski v. Cassc-
les, 53 A.D.2d 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); appeal denied, 360 N.E.2d 1109 (N.Y.
1976)(finding denying eligibility for youthful offender status to youth who was in-
dicted for Class A felony was in all respects constitutional); Gold v. Bartenstein,
418 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1979)(finding Youthful Offender law did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution).
143. Paul Shechtman, A Good Deal for Criminal Justice, March 20, 1997,
N.Y.L.J. 2, Col. 3.
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Rather than diluting society's ability to deter criminal be-
havior, such a provision would grant courts the discretion to
fashion appropriate dispositions for those defendants whose
life, background and circumstances indicate that they are not
deserving of treatment as hardened or habitual criminals. In
this way, courts can choose eligible defendants for senior of-
fender treatment who will not regard society's benevolence
merely as an invitation to further a criminal career. Without
such a provision the courts are compelled to treat all elderly de-
fendants as if they possessed latent criminal tendencies which
only surfaced late in their lives. This philosophy, as we have
seen, can have unduly harsh, and unnecessarily tragic,
consequences.
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